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By LOUIS L. JAFFE t
THE United States has indicted a local of the Teamsters Union' and
a local of the Carpenters Union 2 under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
because each has picketed and boycotted an employer in the course of a
"jurisdictional dispute." The employer has filled jobs over which the
union claims jurisdiction with members of another union. The action of
the Department of Justice is, I believe, a dangerous response to a situa-
tion that has become exasperating to the point of madness. The Teamsters
have held up the progress of public building in Washington by insisting
that they and not the Operating Engineers must man the mobile concrete
mixers. The Carpenters have been disputing with the Machinists over
the installation of certain types of equipment. 8 Anheuser-Busch reports
that it has thereby been forced to abandon plans for an additional plant
costing $750,000. Twenty-five years ago, the AFL awarded this work
to the Machinists and no amount of conference, cajolery or exhortation
could induce the stalwart Carpenters to recognize the award. The Team-
sters and the Carpenters are among the most constant offenders in ob-
structing production. Hence the action of the Department of Justice is
fully understandable, the more so the more we learn of the subject, yet
for all of that it is, I believe, dangerous.
The indictment makes distinctions which ring with reminiscence: "The
said conspiracy and each of the said acts of said conspirators was not
intended to be, nor was it in fact in aid of higher wages, shorter hours,
better working conditions for labor or any other legitimate objective of
a labor union." 4 And the Department in justifying the indictment states:
"It is not the policy of the government to interfere with practices
tending to promote legitimate collective bargaining, to improve hours,
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1. N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1939, p. 1, cols. 2 and 3. The indictment charges Local
No. 639 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters for conspiring to delay govern-
ment building work by strikes, violence, boycotts, etc.
2. N. Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1939, p. 9, col. 4. The indictment charges that William
L. Hutcheson, general president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America and Brother Officers wilfully engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of trade "with
the effect and intent of imposing a direct and unreasonable burden" on trade and com-
merce with unlawful purpose of "inducing and coercing an employer to violate a contract
with one group of employees and replace them with another group."
3. See PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (1914) 417; (1915) 403
et seq.; (1916) 376; (1918) 127; (1919) 464; (1921) 140; (1932) 409-22; (1933) 114.
4. See notes 1 and 2 mtpra.
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wages, health, safety or working conditions. It recognizes the priv-
ilege of organization granted to labor by statute and the common
law. It is only when the privilege is used in a manner that is dearly
unreasonable and unlawful that the government intervenes. ' (Italics
added).
Though it is not the purpose of this Article to consider whether the
anti-trust acts do apply to this situation, it should be noted, parenthetically,
that in Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, the Supreme Court held that a
strike by a building union for a closed shop which impeded the erection
of a building did not restrain interstate commerce within the Sherman
Act.6 In this respect the case is strikingly similar to the St. Louis matter
involving the Carpenters. Perhaps the Department of Justice will argue
that the increase of federal power under the Wagner Act carries with
it an increase of power under the Sherman Act even without amend-
ment, a proposition which the Supreme Court appears so far to have
denied.' Furthermore, is it so clear that the pursuit of jobs and of mem-
bers is not a "legitimate" object of a labor union? In 1932 Chief Judge
Pound and all but one of the judges of the New York Court of Appeals
held that these objectives were within the realm of legitimate economic
conflict and refused to enjoin picketing by a rival union." Granting,
however, that these particular objectives are not legitimate, is a strike
for a closed shop "legitimate?" Is a boycott "legitimate?" Thurman
Arnold, Assistant Attorney-General in charge of the Anti-Trust Division,
and upon whose authority it must be supposed these indictments were
sought, may reply: of course, they are legitimate; we shall take no action
against them. But there are many judges who do think otherwise. For
instance, Mir. Justice No-Love-Lost-on-Labor will say: the government
itself uses the anti-trust acts to curb illegitimate labor activity; we shall
follow suit, though of course, it is for us to say what is illegitimate. Mr.
Arnold has written two books devoted to the proposition that laws are
symbols rather than rational, definite propositions.' They are the sacra-
mental mumbo-jumbos which enable judges to impose their decisions upon
the credulous and the vulgar. The anti-trust laws particularly are a veil
of pretense behind which corporations are allowed to grow big and labor
unions are discouraged. Is it unjustly literal to ask whether the anti-trust
laws are no less symbolic when Mr. Arnold sets them in motion in 1939
than when he writes about them in 1938? Mr. Arnold now distinguishes
between that which the "law" considers "legitimate" and "illegitimate."
5. United States v. Local No. 639 of Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 64705
(D. D. C. 1939), Dep't of Justice Release, Oct. 12, 1939.
6. 289 U. S. 103 (1933).
7. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 40 (1937).
8. Stillwell v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 157 N. E. 130 (1932).
9. THE SymOs OF GovEan.m'sa (1935); THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISU (1937).
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Yet he has taught us that the law - and this one in particular - is with-
out rationally definable content. Nevertheless, there is still a good deal
to his original conception of the anti-trust laws. The "rational" dis-
tinctions which he now makes will not be so objectively inevitable that
everyone else is bound to make the same ones. Perhaps there would be
no danger if he alone initiated the application of the law. Indeed, Mr.
Arnold has indicated that he will prosecute only where there is inter-
ference with "an established and legitimate system of collective bargain-
ing."'" But there will be other attorneys-general after him, and there
is always the possibility of a suit by a private party for triple damages.
Last spring, the Apex Hosiery Company recovered judgment for over
$700,000 against the American Federation of Hosiery Workers in a suit
for triple damages under the Sherman Act for loss caused by a sit-down
strike." Although this decision was recently set aside, 12 in it still lies
the possibility ot bankrupting union treasuries.
The last four years have demonstrated the sensitivity of judges to
public opinion. Courts which had previously been hostile to labor, have
come, under the pressure of the New Deal and the opinion it represents,
to coo like doves at the very mention of collective bargaining. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act has been given the broadest possible construction by the
Supreme Court, to the admiring applause of liberals. Indeed it seems
that in the very type of case which now gives rise to criminal indictment,
the courts hold themselves forbidden to grant an injunction. 3 Liberals
10. N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1939, p. 1, col. 4, p. 12, col. 1. See p. 458 infIra for a dis-
cussion of this statement.
11. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 18,336 (E. D. Pa.
1939). Motion for retrial dismissed April 24. C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 18,353 (E. D.
Pa. 1939). No opinion was written in this case. The treble damages awarded by the court
were $711,932.55. In his instructions to the jury, Kirkpatrick, J., stated that the facts
had been ruled upon by the circuit court of appeals in an action for injunctions under the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 90 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) ; on appeal to the Supreme Court, the
1937 case was dismissed as moot, the strike having been settled. 302 U. S. 656 (1937).
12. 5 LAB. REL REP. 353 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), decided on authority of Levering v.
Morrin, 289 U. S. 103 (1933).
It appears [N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1939, p. 30, col. 4] that Mr. Arnold is prepared to
argue in favor of the Union in the Apex case on the ground that the ends were legitimate;
he must thus take the further position that the legitimacy of the meanr (here a sit-down
strike much disfavored by the courts) is immaterial. But few courts will be inclined
to permit illegitimate means, however valid the ends. Perhaps he is prepared to argue that
the restraint in the jurisdictional dispute is "material" whereas in the Apex case it was
not. In the Apex case the court seemed inclined to argue that not only was there no
"direct" restraint but no "material" one. This is a suggestion of the monopoly test applied
on behalf of industrial combinations ("rule of reason") but hitherto rejected for labor
unions.
13. Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U. S. 323 (1938) ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. International Union of Brewery Workers, 5 LAB. REL. REP. 112 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939);
Houston v. North Texas Motor Freight Lines, 24 F. Supp. 619 (W. D. Okla. 1938);
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have fought hard to curb the power of the courts to cripple labor by
inspired reading of the vague phrases of the anti-trust laws and expansive
conceptions of equity jurisdiction. In an era when liberals have secured
a measure of political power, the courts have seen fit to relinquish some
of this jurisdiction. But there are surely some courts which have yielded
more from pressure than conviction. The New Deal has been the avowed
champion of labor. Once let this government fire a shot (however justly
in the particular case), it may be heard (however unjustly) as an an-
nouncement of open season. Shooting will become general and the hounds
will begin to run.
Yet the jurisdictional dispute gives rise to real evils. Labor and those
who fight for labor have refused to take these evils seriously. On count-
less occasions they have gravely deplored jurisdictional disputes, but
rarely have they been willing to support any method for dealing with
them effectively or mitigating their impact on outsiders, be they workers
or employers.' 4 This is quite understandable. Any solution will neces-
sarily involve some loss of autonomy or some restriction imposed by
judicial or administrative action upon strike, picket and boycott. Until
very recently, labor has been entirely on the defensive. The intervention
of the state has been almost uniformly on behalf of its enemies. Labor
has not been in a position to offer reasons why injunctions should go
against them or admit that any injunction was good. The injunctions
would continue to issue, the reasons and distinctions would be forgotten.
Furthermore, the jurisdictional dispute is not entirely evil, any more than
partisan politics is entirely evil. Both are mechanisms of representatiye
government whereby the leader seeks his constituency and in turn is
tried and discarded, whereby the group in order better to fulfill its function
seeks to augment its membership.
Labor now is sometimes plaintiff. The labor boards express its aspira-
tions, seek to protect it in the process of collective bargaining, to compel
a certain minimum of cooperation by the employer in dealing with its
representatives. In the federal and many state courts, the use of the
injunction is restricted." There is, consequently, less reason for oppo-
sition to any authoritative mechanism for protecting production from
the blight of the jurisdictional dispute. Labor's indifference will beget
prosecutions under the anti-trust law or, as in Oregon, repressive anti-
Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263 (W. D. Mo. 1937), aff'd, 96 F. (2d) 478 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1938); Cupples Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 20 F. Supp. S94 (E. D.
Mlo. 1937) ; Sharp & Dohme, Inc. v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, 24 F. Supp.
701 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
14. E.g., BRooKs, UNIoxs OF THEm Owx CHoosING (1939) discussed bifra p. 456.
15. Sixteen states have anti-injunction statutes similar in type to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act: Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, .Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, Wis-
consin and Wyoming.
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labor laws.' 6 In Oregon, public support for such a law was won by the
experience of a general stoppage for three months of the lumber industry
by carpenters, teamsters and longshoremen, despite or because of the
formal certification by the National Labor Relations Board of a CIO
union.' 7 Labor can rightly claim that these steps are reactionary. But
those who deplore such laws, who shout reaction at each new assault,
must be prepared for more and more reaction if they persist in treating
these disputes as their own private business and employ all their in-
genuity in pointing out the "dangers" of any attempt to deal authorita-
tively with them. There are dangers in any authoritative solution, but
they should be balanced against the dangers of even worse solutions,
assuming that the anarchy of no solution is not in itself a reason for
running some risks.
The application of the anti-trust laws is one method of authoritative
solution. Undoubtedly it may frighten a few of the worst offenders-
and some unions are notoriously worse than others- into more seemly
ways. But we may well fear that it is a clumsy, dangerous instrument
which may fall into the hands of the enemy. This Article will examine
the other possible solutions and the experience with them both for the
light thrown on the conduct of the Department of Justice and on the
possibilities of a better solution.
16. Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2. The law prohibits picketing except in a labor dispute which
it defines as an "actual bona fide controversy in which the disputants stand in proximate
relations of employer and the majority of his employees" and which concerns wages, hours
or working conditions. The definition specifically excludes "disputes between organiza-
tions or groups of employees as to which shall act" as representatives. Id. at §§ 1, 3.
The Oregon law was approved by a vote of 197,771 to 148,460 at the general election,
Nov. 8, 1938. It has been held constitutional by the Oregon circuit court in a suit for
a declaratory judgment. A.F.L. v. Bain, 4 LAB. REL. REP. 824 (Ore. 1939). A similar
law submitted in California met with a decisive defeat. In Washington at the
same election an act making strikes unlawful unless authorized by a majority vote
of the employees was defeated by a margin of about 9 per cent (1938) 3 LAn. Ria,. Rr.
331. The 1939 amendment to the Wisconsin Anti-Injunction Act. [Wis. Laws 1939, c. 25]
restricts the definition of "labor dispute" to any controversy between an employer and the
majority of his employees in a collective bargaining unit. And the Pennsylvania law has
been amended [Pa. Laws 1939, Act 163] so that injunctive relief shall be available where
a labor dispute breaches a valid contract between an employer and the representative of
his employees as selected under the state or National Labor Relations Act if the com-
plainant has not committed an unfair labor practice or breached the contract; when a
union tries to compel an employer to require his employees to join it before it has gained
a majority or while an attempt is made to coerce an employer to violate the state or Na-
tional Labor Relations Act; or where employees seize or damage plant or other property
of an employer.
17. TimE, Nov. 29, 1937, p. 15. The NLRB certified CIO in seven of biggest saw-
mills. Notwithstanding, Carpenters (AFL) picketed and Teamsters refused to handle
product of mills. In turn, Longshoremen (CIO) refused to handle product of mills deal-
ing with AFL Carpenters.
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I. THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AS A FORUM FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
Early in its history, the National Labor Relations Board was asked
to determine whether the "machine-fixers" in two large tobacco plants
were to be represented for purposes of collective bargaining by the
International Association of Machinists, or by the Tobacco W\rorkers'
International Union. Admittedly the Machinists Union was the chosen
representative of the so-called Machinists proper; the Tobacco Workers
of the industrial employees exclusive of the men in question. The two
international unions disputed jurisdiction over the fixers. The question
of jurisdiction as such was not the question before the Board. The Act
authorizes it to determine "appropriate units" for collective bargaining,
and these determinations do not necessarily follow or purport to follow
the lines laid down by union charters.' In nearly all instances, the unit
has included no more than the employees of a single employer or some
portion of them. 9 The purpose of the determination is to secure a repre-
sentative to deal with the employer. Charter jurisdiction and trade classi-
fications are not the only criteria of appropriateness. These are dravn,
as well, from the history of the relations betAveen the workers and the
employer in question. If, for example, the plant has been organized on an
"industrial" basis, and collective bargaining has been carried on consist-
ently by a single trade union representative, it will be held that a single
plant-wide unit is appropriate and craft lines will be ignored."0 Under
18. Section 9 (b) of the NLRA provides: "The Board shall decide in each case
whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organiza-
tion and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
19. But in Shipowners' Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 7 N.L.R.B. 14)02 (1933), long-
shoremen on the Pacific Coast were treated as a unit, because collective bargaining had
in the past (under the auspices of the AFL) been carried on between a coast-wide asso-
ciation of employers and one union. The AFL which lost the election-and on a port
basis would have won four of the smaller ports-deeply resented this decision. It is one
of the chief counts in their charge that the National Labor Relations Board favors the
CIO. See Analysis of Senate Bill zooo (1939) 4 LA-& Rrx.. REP. 183. It is interesting to
note in this connection that the CIO in recognition of AFL majorities in Tacoma, Wash-
ington, and three adjacent ports has agreed not to assert its right to preferential hiring
in those ports, and has embodied the agreement in a covering memorandum attached to
its agreement with the employer's association. (1938) 3 LA. RV_ REP. 180.
The amendment to § 9 (b) proposed by the AFL includes a provision "that an appro-
priate unit shall not embrace employees of more than one employer. Two or more units
may, by voluntary consent, bargain through the same agent or agents vith an employer
or employers, through agent or agents." (1939) 3 L, A. Ri. REP. 674.
20. Huth & James Shoe Mfg. Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 220 (1938); Daily Mirror, Inc.,
5 N. L. R. B. 362 (1938); Fried, Ostermann Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1938); American
Can Co., 14 N.L.R.B. Nos. 1177-S (1939), (1939) 4 LAB. Ra. REn. 849.
1940]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the so-called Globe doctrine," craftsmen who do have a history of plant
organization may by a majority vote throw in their lot with an all-
company unit.22 Thus it will be a matter of history and choice whether
the representative in any one plant will follow the jurisdictional lines
of charters. Of course there may be no plant history and the Board
may have to make a decision on the basis of job analysis. Though it
does this for only the plant in question, still its decision may bear closely
on the merits of the jurisdictional dispute.
In the Tobacco cases, the Board refused to intervene, at least in so
far as it was asked to assign, for purpose of collective bargaining, the
fixers to one or another of the warring camps.23 This involved, it said,
a jurisdictional dispute between unions subject to a common federation.
It was more appropriate that the Federation should settle this family
quarrel. "Such a question," said the Board "involving solely and in
a peculiar fashion the internal affairs of the American Federation of
Labor and its chartered bodies, can best be decided by the parties them-
selves." 24 The Board went on to quote the reasons given in its excellent
opinion in the earlier Aluminum case :25
". .. The availability of the Board as a convenient forum for the
airing of such problems would induce the parties to present them to
the Board without first having made any real attempt to compose
their differences among themselves. The consequent accumulation
of cases on its docket would considerably hamper the work of the
Board. Nor do we feel that the petitioner itself after a full con-
sideration of the implications of its request would desire the Board
to pass judgment upon such matters.
"'It is preferable that the Board should not interfere with the
internal affairs of labor organizations. Self-organization of employees
implies a policy of self-management. The role that organizations of
employees eventually must play in the structure established by
21. Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
22. See (1939) 3 LAB. RzL. REP. 674 for the proposal of the AFL to amend the
Labor Act by a provision which would tend to prevent such an occurrence: "That when
a craft exists, composed of one or more employees, then such craft shall constitute a unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining for such employee or employees; a
majority of such craft employees may designate a representative for such unit."
23. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. & Int. Ass'n of Machinists, etc.; Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. & Int. Ass'n of Machinists, etc., 1 N.L.R.B. 604 (1936).
24. Id. at 609.
25. Aluminum Co. and Aluminum Workers, 1 N.L.R.B. 530 (1936). This case did
not strictly involve a jurisdictional dispute. The question was whether the president of
the AFL had power to supersede the authority of a federal union in negotiating a labor
agreement covering the members of the union. Federal unions are chartered dlireetly by
the Federation and are under its control or supervision. The issue, thus, was not in what
unit or union the workers belonged but who under the constitution of the AFL was
authorized to act for the union. The reasons quoted in the text are peculiarly applica-
ble to such a controversy.
[Vol. 49: 424
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Congress through that Act is a large and vital one. They will best
be able to perform that role if they are permitted freely to work out
the solutions to their own internal problems. In its permanent opera-
tion the Act envisages cohesive organizations, well-constructed and
intelligently guided. Such organizations will not develop if they are
led to look elsewhere for the solutions to such problems. In fine, the
policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to encourage the pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and to protect employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed to them from the denial and inter-
ference of employers. That policy can be best advanced by the
Board's devoting its attention to controversies that concern such
fundamental matters.' "26
The Board has done wisely well to dwell on the pre-eminent moral
values of self-government. Samuel Gompers probably caricatured the
point when, after lamenting that "in the main, contentions have not
abated nor have decisions been respected or complied with," he happily
noted that these disputes "have developed a high order of intelligence
in discussion among our unionists, keen perception in industrial juris-
prudence."" This illumination affords, no doubt, many a merry and
satisfying debate in convention. It is basic to our liberalistic philosophy
that it is worth paying high to allow a maximum of self-government.
It stimulates the individual to a fuller, more creative use of his faculties
and so enriches his experience and adds to the sum total of his satisfac-
tion. We hope, too, that by invoking participation in a high degree of
those more immediately concerned, we shall secure more comprehensive
and workable solutions. These hopes are enough in themselves to justify
autonomy where the questions for decision affect solely those repre-
sented in the organization. But it cannot be admitted that a question
of jurisdiction is, as the Board says, "solely the internal affair" of the
Federation. If by that is meant that the frustration of the workers'
right to choose their bargaining agent or the stoppage of production by
boycott and picket is an internal affair, it is obviously not true. The
employer has not submitted his interest to adjudication by the Federation
nor have those of his workers who are not members of any of its unions.
The Board is asked to deal with one of the effects of a failure by the
Federation to settle a question of internal policy. It does not settle the
question itself, though, of course, its determination may have reper-
cussions within the Federation. It may be significant that the Globe
doctrine, whereby the choice might have been put up to the men, had
not yet been developed. The mere fact that the workers may choose a
representative in spite of the failure of the Federation to solve the juris-
26. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. & Int. Ass'n of Machinists, etc.; Bron & William-
son Tobacco Corp. & Int. Ass'n of Machinists, etc., 1 N.L.R.B. 604, 609 (1936).
27. PRocEEDINGs OF THE AirsmcAir FEDE:ATXOx OF LABOR (1905) 23. Hereafter
these proceedings will be cited simply, e.g., PRoc. (1905).
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dictional question may weaken the position of one of the parties to the
dispute and so either strengthen or weaken the hand of the Federation,
depending on which party it favors. We may take it as a major premise
that the Federation should be left as far as possible to settle these dis-
putes. If it were generally the case that the Federation succeeds in so
doing, the protection and fostering of a process so valuable might well
involve non-interference with the external ill-effects of an occasional
failure. But if it is not so, we should eschew the hopeful generality, face
the fact and consider its bearing.
The constitution of the Federation does not specifically provide any
machinery for settling jurisdictional disputes. In 1892 the Committee
on Grievances, to which at that time jurisdictional disputes were referred,
reporting on the complaint of the Furniture Workers against the Car-
penters (a dispute which was not to be laid to rest for 20 years),
recommended "that the two bodies come together and try to form a plan
by which they can work in harmony. Your Committee do not believe
it lies within their province to take any other action, as the Constitution
gives to each body the right to control its own affairs."28
The reference apparently is to Article IX, Section 5: "While we
recognize the right of each trade to manage its own affairs, it shall be
the duty of the Executive Council, to secure the unification of all labor
organizations, so far as to assist each other in any trade dispute."
In 1900 a resolution was offered that the International Typographical
Union, which had refused to arbitrate a dispute as suggested by the
previous convention, be suspended. But the Committee on Grievances
proposed and secured the acceptance of a substitute:
"While we concede that in this controversy the I.T.U. is within
its constitutional powers in reserving to itself the right to say whether
or not the dispute between that union and the I.A. of M. on the lino-
type controversy shall be arbitrated we deeply regret that the I.T.U.
did not accept the expressed desire of the American Federation of
Labor in the Detroit Convention, to submit the dispute to a fair
tribunal for adjustment, and instead of declaring by vote or otherwise
that we shall take no action in the premises, or that the charter of the
I.T.U. be revoked, the American Federation of Labor in convention
assembled pledges its good services for further mediation between
the organizations concerned and directs the incoming Executive
Council to stand ready to act in that capacity should opportunity of
doing so present itself during the incoming year.' ' a°
A general resolution of the same tenor was adopted. It was resolved
that in order to eliminate friction and induce parties to make a serious
effort at conciliation, the Federation would not take jurisdiction unless
28. PROC. (1892) 34.
29. PROC. (1900) 150.
30. PRoc (1900) 150.
[Vol. 49: 424
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the parties consented to abide by its decision." It was not likely that
this mild view of the Federation's powers would be proof against extreme
provocation. Between 1900 and 1910, the irritation caused by juris-
dictional disputes became acute. Gompers in report after report com-
mented dolefully on the failure of the Federation to settle jurisdictional
disputes.3 In 1902 the Charter of the American Society of Engineers
was revoked. Gompers said that this was done under stress of "intense
feeling and excitement," 33 and persistently expressed the opinion that
revocation was ineffective and contrary to the philosophy of the labor
movement. Solutions based on consent he held to be the only ones worth
having. But there can be no doubt now that the Federation is empowered
to interpret the charters it has issued and exclude from its association
those who refuse to abide by its judgment. This is only obliquely recog-
nized by the constitutional provision added in 1907, that the Executive
Council may be authorized by a two-thirds vote of the Convention to
revoke a charter." Nevertheless, the weapon of revocation or suspension
is of limited utility.3" The Federation, with an occasional inexplicable ex-
ception,3" will rarely invoke it even in support of its considered and reiter-
31. PROC. (1900) 146-7.
32. PROC. (1904) 22; (1905) 23; (1907) 44, 45.
33. Proc. (1907) 44.
34. Article IX, § 12: "The Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor
shall only have power to revoke the charter of an affiliated National or International
Union when the revocation has been ordered by a two-thirds majority of a regular Con-
vention of the American Federation of Labor, by a roll-call vote."
35. Does the provision quoted in the previous footnote require a vote of two-thirds
of a convention to authorize the Executive Council to "suspend" a union or for "suspen-
sion" by the Convention itself? Practice has settled the proposition that the Council may
suspend without any authorization at all and a mere majority of Council or Convention
is enough. It is said that suspension simply prevents the penalized union from exercising
its vote, and that because its jurisdiction remains it is not like a revocation. Pnc. (1925)
269-270. Thus, in 1936 the Executive Council suspended the CIO unions for "dualism"
and then secured convention ratification by a majority of those present, excluding those
suspended. There would have been a majority in any case though probably not the two-
thirds needed for revocation. PRoC. (1936) 65--86, 503 et seq. The vote appears at p. 552.
The constitution is not clear whether the Convention must revoke by two-thirds vote or
whether it has the power at all. Article IX, § 12 relates by its terms to authorizing the
Executive Council to revoke. Matthew W\oll seems to argue that the Convention might
revoke by a simple majority. Id. at 515.
36. In 1924 the Executive Council awarded the drivers of the Railhay Express Com-
pany to the Teamsters Union though most of them had been organized by the Railway
Clerks Union. PROC. (1924) 84. This decision -was in itself unusual since there seem
to have been no previous conferences or attempts at voluntary settlement without which
the Federation rarely ever makes an authoritative decision. Indeed the Constitution
provides (at present Art. III, § 12) that no grievance shall be considered by any Con-
vention "where the parties thereto have not previously held a conference and attempted
to adjust the same themselves.'
The Convention on the suggestion of the Executive Council authorized it to suspend
if the clerks did not within 90 days comply with the decision of the previous year. Pnoc.
1940] 433
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ated declarations of jurisdiction, at least until years of conferences and
arbitrations have worn out even the half-humorous assumption that the
dispute is arbitrable-and then rarely against a powerful union. In 1915,
when a committee brought in i resolution for ousting the Carpenters (who
have acted on the consistent, indomitable principle that they will never
accept any unfavorable decision), a member of the committee admitted
that the resolution was not seriously pressed, but had been presented to
silence those who complained that only the charters of weak unions were
revoked.-7 In this instance the Carpenters disdained to oppose the reso-
lution or defend their position. Indeed, Andrew Furuseth of the Seamen
suggested, unrebuked, that the Carpenters were provoking the ouster so
that they might carry on their raids without being railed at by their
victims or scolded by the pious members of the Federation. The reso-
lution was, of course, defeated. A revocation or threat of revocation
may be effective against a small union which relies heavily on the good-
will of the labor movement. Occasionally a large union, such as the
Railway Clerks, has been ousted and has subsequently capitulated. 9 The
Federation does have a few other sanctions. An instruction to the state
and city central federations not to cooperate with the locals of the recal-
citrant union may seriously penalize them, particularly where, as in the
building trades, the sympathetic strike and boycott is customary. Curi-
ously, unions have objected that even such discipline is improper. In
1905 the Convention, after refusing to authorize revocation of the
charter of the Brewery Workers, resolved that all national, state, and
local organs of the Federation "exert every influence and power at their
command to make the above decision [settling a jurisdictional dispute]
operative and effective." 4° The Brewers objected to this on the ground
that it was a "police" method. It undoubtedly was, and there is certainly
now no question that such methods are accepted as part of the legitimate
machinery of the Federation.
Combined with the indeterminate character of the procedure and the
limited effectiveness of the sanctions is the inevitable absence of clear
standards of judgment. Some of the earliest charters define jurisdiction
quite broadly. That about which there has been most dispute, the Brewers'
charter, gave to the union jurisdiction over all "brewery workers." This
was in 1887 when narrow principles of trade and craft unionism had
not crystallized, when unionism as a whole had collapsed, and when
any organization which seemed able to advance energetically into the
(1925) 260-270. This authority was exercised. PROC. (1926) 45. In 1928 the Executive
Council is gratified to report an agreement between the Clerks and the Teamsters and
the reinstatement of the Clerks in the AFL Paoc. (1928) 65, 66.
37. PRoc. (1915) 407.
38. Id. at 413.
39. See note 36 supra.
40. PRoc. (1905) 223.
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vast no-mans-land of the unorganized was given leave to go ahead.
Charters subsequently predicated on trade lines conflicted with the earlier
ones. At the end of the century, the trade unionists were pressing reso-
lutions that the Federation was "eternally opposed" to encroachments
on craft jurisdiction. In 1900 the constitution was amended to provide
that no charter should be granted without "a positive and clear definition
of the trade jurisdiction" of the applicant, and the charter shall not be
granted if the jurisdiction claimed is "a trespass on the jurisdiction of
existing affiliated unions." Howevermuch this might help in the future.
it did not solve inherited problems. In 1900 the Grievance Committee
in a resolution adopted by the Convention said: "Ve find ourselves con-
fronted with the undesirable task of limiting on the one hand what is
popularly regarded as trade autonomy; or on the other, of disintegrating
a composite organization which while in existence has demonstrated its
ability both to protect and advance the interests of its members. In such
cases we are strongly of the opinion that narrow conceptions of strict
trade autonomy should give way. We desire further to say that this
body can not, in our ophion, presume to transfer bodies of men from
one organization to another, inless with their [i.e., the men or the or-
ganizations' or both?] consent."4' The italicized words reflect the view
of Federation power prevailing in 1900. In 1901 the Convention adopted
the so-called Scranton Resolution, a rather vague wishful statement
which was intended permanently to settle the question by leaving it where
it found it.4
This resolution emphasizes the superior position of a craft claim but
admits exceptions for occasional deviations which have grown up because
of special historical, geographical and economic factors. Thus in 1900
the Convention gave engineers and firemen, who were then organized
by the Brewery Union, to the Brewery Union.3 If by this was meant,
and it was later so held (at one stage of the controversy)"4 that engineers
and firemen would be divided between unions depending on their mem-
bership at the time of decision, it might seriously split the labor front
in any one plant. And in these judgments of Solomon there is rarely
present any "true mother" who will withdraw her claim in order to keep
the baby whole. The Federation has found it difficult to formulate any
consistent policy for settling disputes of this sort, the weight to be
given to the relevant factors often depending on the advocacy and
strength of the party putting them forth.
It is equally difficult to formulate criteria for drawing the lines be-
tween crafts which work on closely related or interchangeable operations.
41. Paoc. (1900) 146. (Italics added).
42. PRoc. (1901) 240. The Resolution admits the difficulty of draiAng craft lines and
urges amalgamation and arbitration as a remedy for excessive classification.
43. PRoC. (1900) 67-68.
44. PRoC. (1902) 208.
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In part this is the result of faulty or incomplete definition, but drafts-
manship can never eliminate the problem, because the rapid shifts in
technological process and in material constantly change the nature of
the jobs to be done. If a metal door is substituted for a wood door on
a building job, is the installation to be done by a carpenter or a sheet
metal worker? Is it the nature of the job or of the material which governs
decision? There is no overwhelming logic which dictates either choice.4"
To be sure, that may be true of many choices which must be made by
a court. But here there is wanting not only the persuasive quality of
decisions validated by objective standards of judgment; there is no
determinate procedure, no effective sanction and no inclination to accept
the decision. The Federation has been unable to develop, at. least among
the dominant unions, a conviction that the need of an authoritative
tribunal is in itself a sufficient reason for accepting its determination.
A few examples may serve to give meaning to these rather general
observations. Let us first consider the dispute between the Woodworkers
(Woodworkers International Union, Amalgamated) and the Carpenters
and Joiners Union. It was first brought before the Convention in 1901.40
The Convention adopted a resolution of its committee which found
that the Carpenters had in 1894 conceded to the Woodworkers juris-
diction over mill hands, millwrights, and stairs builders, roughly persons
making wood objects with factory machines, and that the Carpenters had
consistently violated this so-called agreement by initiating such persons.
4 7
The Convention recommended a further effort by the parties at adjust-
ment. In 1902 the Carpenters, resorting to a familiar tactic of defense,
sought unsuccessfully to secure the revocation of the Woodworkers'
charter.48 Instead, the Convention ordered the parties to arbitrate.40
In 1903 the Carpenters claimed that the arbitral award was procedurally
defective and were overruled by the Convention.50 In 1904 the Executive
Council was authorized to suspend the Carpenters' charter unless the
Carpenters complied."1 In 1905 the Executive Council reports that it
believes revocation to be a futile step; it suggests instead further con-
ference. The Carpenters give notice that no quarter could be expected
except through amalgamation with them. 2 In 1906 the Executive
Council reports no progress, and drops a tear for the innocent employer:
by this time one union was treating, as unfair, shops having an agree-
45. See p. 442 infra, for the Federation's unhappy experiences with this problem.
46. In 1889 the predecessor union of Woodworkers, the Furniture Workers, brought
essentially the same complaint before the convention. PRoc. (1889) 34. In 1892 the Con-
vention advised the two parties to negotiate claiming that because of principles of trade
union autonomy it had no jurisdiction to decide. Paoc. (1892) 34.
47. PRoc. (1901) 252-3. 48. PRoc. (1902) 52.
49. PRoc. (1902) 166, 184-185. 50. Psoc. (1903) 242-3.
51. PROC. (1904) 219. 52. PRoc. (1905) 227.
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ment with the other.13 In 1907 the Convention learns that the rank and
file of the Woodworkers had, on referendum, rejected amalgamation.'
At this the Convention begins to lose patience with the persistent little
Woodworkers. It refuses to reindorse the award in their favor which
only three years before it had approved. It recommends a further con-
ferenceY The dispute has now entered that stage so familiar in inter-
national politics where the stubborn little nation is "inciting" the big one.
The Carpenters at the time had approximately 1800 votes in the Con-
vention, the Woodworkers 32. In 1909 the Committee on Adjustments
reports a plan of amalgamation. If the \Woodworkers refuse, their
charter is to be revoked. They are damned if they do and damned if
they don't. The secretary of the committee bases this brutal resolve upon
the ironic dictates of justice typically appealed to in power politics:
"The Committee has come to the conclusion that where certain men
in this labor movement do not see the benefit of concentration, we believe
it is time to compel them to get into line for their own good.""
The Convention allowed a decent interval for performing the sacrificial
act. In 1912, after further threats, the Woodworkers amalgamated. 3
We are not concerned primarily with the justice of this settlement. It
is more to our purpose that the dispute was settled. But even on the
level of utility and efficiency, that it took twelve years to solve the problem
detracts greatly from the achievement. Yet in one sense the Federation
cannot legitimately be criticized for delay. In this case the only quick
solution possible was an inequitable one. Where the Federation has
persisted in maintaining a just decision in behalf of a weak against a
strong union, it has had to sacrifice the objective of in fact settling the
dispute or, at least, of settling it on terms announced by it. The Federa-
tion in 1917, in a dispute between the Flint Glass Workers and the
Machinists, confirmed a voluntary arbitration award giving jurisdiction
over glass molder-makers to the former.' It has tried often and again
to assist the feeble Glass Workers in bringing the powerful Machinists
to book."0 In 1919 Wharton of the Machinists, unabashed, asked why
the Machinists should obey decisions when others did not; he said they
would obey, if everyone else did.6" In 1931 the Executive Council was
still seeking a solution." If the objective is the settlement of disputes on
the best terms possible, it is at least questionable whether this rather
Quixotic solution is preferable to the Machiavellism of the other. The
case was, however, possibly more difficult to solve: whereas all Wood-
53. PRoc. (1906) 73, 203. 54. Pnoc. (1907) 82.
55. PRoc. (1907) 270. 56. Pnoc. (1909) 291.
57. Pioc. (1910) 289; (1911) 322: this resolution practically revoked the charter.
58. PRoc. (1912) 107. 59. Proc. (1917) 124-125, 337-389.
60. PRoc. (1918) 293-297. 61. Pnoc. (1919) 382.
62. PRoc. (1931) 433.
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workers might find a logical basis of amalgamation with the Carpenters,
the Glass Workers as a group, aside from the disputed ones, may have
nothing in common with the Machinists; to take away even a small
number from a union already small may make administration financially
impossible.
Let us consider now that cause clfbre: the matter of the Brewery
Workers against the Teamsters, Engineers, Firemen and Coopers. The
Brewers received their charter in 1887, granting them jurisdiction over
all brewery workers; the Teamsters received theirs in 1899, the Engi-
neers in 1898, the Firemen in 1899. In 1899 the conflict between the
Brewers, on the one hand, and the Firemen and Engineers, on the other,
became acute. One delegate, protesting the claims of the Brewers, said
that the Federation "might as well go on record as to whether it is an
industrial organization or a trades union.""6 The Convention authorized
a committee of the Executive Council to deal with the case. In 1900 the
Convention adopted a resolution confirming the Brewers' jurisdiction
over "the employees of the brewery in the United Brewery Workers
Union" provided that (a) craftsmen already organized in their own
crafts were not to be molested but might voluntarily join the Brewers
and (b) team drivers not working directly out of the brewery should
go to the Teamsters' union. 4 In 1901 a committee found that the
Brewers were not respecting the decision of 1900 relating to the Firemen
and Engineers. The Executive Council was authorized to settle the dis-
pute and revoke charters upon non-compliance 5 In 1902 a committee
decided that the 1900 decision gave jurisdiction of all craftsmen, except
those already in craft unions, to the Brewers. But the Convention adopted
a resolution that all craftsmen must belong to their respective unions.00
In 1904 the craftsmen were infuriated with the Brewers because they
had secured injunctions against the craft unions." The Convention
resolved that the Brewers should get the injunction dissolved and call
off brewers who were scabbing in a plant struck by the Engineers and
Firemen." In the same year a new settlement was resolved upon, con-
firming all present members to the Brewers, but providing that in the
future craftsmen go to the craft unions and that there be joint boards
in breweries where a majority of craftsmen were not represented by
the Brewers. The Executive Council was to revoke charters on non-
63. PROC. (1899) 127.
64. PROC. (1900) 147-148.
65. PROC. (1901) 255. That part of the dispute relating to the Coopers has not been
set out. See PROC. (1900) 147, 149; (1901) 127, 227, 245; (1902) 195; (1905) 228;
(1914) 125.
66. PROC. (1902) 208.
67. In 1903 a formal resolution confirmed previous decisions PRoc. (1903) 218, 219.
A Brewers' resolution "confirming" their charter was defeated. PROC. (1903) 249.
68. PRoc. (1904) 228-229.
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compliance with this settlement"0 In 1905 the Council reported that
none of the unions were complying and that it had hardly seemed sensible
to revoke all the charters.7" The Convention reaffirmed the 1904 decision
and admonished all affiliated national and local bodies "to exert every
influence and power at their command to make the above decision oper-
ative and effective."' 71 The Brewers objected to this resolution as in-
volving "police methods."
Next year we hear that the injunction against the Firemen and Engi-
neers is undissolved and the Convention again authorizes charter revo-
cation.72 In 1907 the Executive Council actually revoked the Brewers'
charter (a referendum among the Brewery- workers rejected the 1904
award), but the Convention, apparently shaken by "a storm of protest




reinstated the charter and advised further conference with disciplinary
action to follow.74 In 1908 the Brewers and Engineers agreed on a plan
under which the Engineers were to keep their members, and those in
the Brewers were to choose between the two unions.73 The Teamsters,
on the other hand, tried to secure a reversal of the 1904 decision in
so far as it awarded to the Brewers' drivers working out of the brewery.
The Convention refused to reverse its decision. 0 In 1910 the Conven-
tion was told that, of the engineers in the Brewers Union, 1092 had
elected to stay, 62 to go to the Engineers. 77 In 1911 the Brewery-
Teamster dispute broke out again in the soft-drink industry,", and was
referred to conference. In 1912 the Convention heard the quite familiar
story that so far the parties had not been able to find a time to meet. 0
In 1913 the Executive Council reported that since nearly all brewery
teamsters were in the Brewery Union they should remain there. The
Convention adopted the report."0 In 1914 we hear that the parties are
still at a stalemate."1 And then for years after - until 1933 - there
is a blessed silence. 2 Apparently we are safe in believing that in 1915
there was a written agreement between the Brewers and Teamsters
giving the brewery drivers to the Brewers and the soft drink drivers
to the Teamsters. At least in 1933 when the conflict again broke out
69. PRoc. (1904) 217, 225-227. 70. PRoc. (1905) 62.
71. Paoc. (1905) 223. 72. Pnoc. (1905) 229.
73. LoIMwx, THE A'1ERICAN FEDFRATIoN OF L.ABOR (1933) 93, n. 21. This same
Convention added Art. IX, § 12 to the constitution providing for revocation of charters
by two-thirds vote of the Executive Council when authorized by a two-thirds majority
vote of a convention.
74. PRoc. (1907) 275-277. 75. PRoc. (1903) 212.
76. PRoc. (1903) 213. 77. PRoC. (1910) 106.
78. PRmOC (1911) 331. 79. PROc. (1912) 117.
80. PROC. (1913) 105, 340. 81. PRoc. (1914) 401.
82. In 1914 a quarrel arose between the Brewers and the Carpenters. Pnmc. (1914)
418. An agreement entered into in 1915 [PRoc. (1915) 121] vas confirmed by the Car-
penters Convention in 1917. PRoc. (1917) 128.
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in its present fury, the president of the Brewers produced such an instru-
ment purportedly signed by Mr. Tobin, president of the Teamsters. Mr.
Tobin amazingly denied that he ever signed or heard of such a document.
Yet it appears that in 1920 he referred to "an" agreement arguing that
a case in point was not covered by it."8 Suffice it to say that in 1915,
after 15 years of wrangling, this fight was settled for a time at least.
The Brewers had far fewer votes than their much larger opponents,
but won this act of the drama probably because they were first on the
scene, and had built up enormous loyalty among brewery workers.
Then Prohibition came. The Brewery Union continued to pay the
annual tax to the Federation on its membership. Whether it was real
membership, the Federation did not too closely inquire. It was willing
to sanction this benevolent fraud, if such it was, so that in the event
of repeal, the union would be ready to take up its work again without
break. In 1933 the Executive Council called the Brewers before it to
show why all craftsmen who should work in the breweries, to be newly
opened, should not go to their respective craft union. Wherewith the
Council at once awarded the Engineers, Firemen and Teamsters to their
respective unions, and notified all bodies to enforce the decision, prior
to any Convention action. The break-neck speed of this decision must
surely take away the breath of the reader, who if he has kept awake,
must at least have been lulled into a settled expectation of unceasing
conference. And what makes this haste even more startling is that the
decision seems to reverse decisions which had been fifteen years in the
making. The crafts argued that during Prohibition there had been little
or no brewing, that the craftsmen in question had gone into their
respective unions, and that thus it was no longer necessary to make an
exception to craft jurisdiction in order to protect an existing industrial
jurisdiction."' The Convention confirmed the award. The Brewery
Workers in a referendum promptly repudiated the award by a vote of
24,161 to 170, but Mr. Green, president of the American Federation
of Labor, pointed out that the wishes of the men were irrelevant. A
union cannot determine its own jurisdiction."0 In 1934 the Convention,
over the protest of the Teamsters, sent the matter to conference." In
1936 the conferences were still proceedingA And in the meantime the
Teamsters and the Brewers were picketing and boycotting plants in
which the other had agreements ;" the brewery operators were uncertain
as to which union was the representative of its men. Even though they
83. PROC. (1933) 339, 348. 84. PROC. (1933) 115.
85. Id. at 329-331. 86. PROC. (1934) 144-152.
87. Id. at 459. 88. PRoC. (1936) 200.
89. The Supreme Court of Washington has enjoined a secondary boycott by the team-
sters Union of a brewery employing members of the Brewers' union. United Union
Brewing Co. v. Beck, et a!., 5 LAB. REL. REP. 137 (Wash. 1939).
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should decide, then they might incur the punitive action of the rejected
union.
The National Labor Relations Board, as we have seen, does not act
in this type of case. One federal court has refused to give the Brewery
Operators a declaratory judgment advising them with which union it
should bargain collectively, on the ground the Federation is the final
authority;9 and more recently a federal court has reached the same
result, but on the ground that the Labor Board has sole jurisdiction to
make such a determination." In 1937 the Brewers Union unsuccessfully
sought a direct review of the Federation ruling. 2 Now it has again
sought relief; at the present writing it has secured from the District
Court of the District of Columbia an injunction. 0 Certain of the Feder-
ationists, at least, intensely resent the action of the Brewers in appealing
to the age-old enemy, the courts." Forty years in search of a forum:
it would seem a sufficient concession to voluntarism.
The Federation has occasionally established formal tribunals for set-
tling jurisdictional disputes. Such a tribunal has existed in one or
another form in the Building Trades Department, a subsidiary body of
the Federation composed of the building unions. Because of the great
number of charters in the building trades, the arbitrary craft distinc-
tions which they perpetuate, and the constant change of materials and
process, jurisdictional disputes in this field are numerous and costly.
Both of the recent indictments under the Sherman Act relate to disputes
in the building trades. One of the unions concerned is the Carpenters.
This union has been the particular bite vzoire of every attempt to estab-
lish an authoritative tribunal in the building trades. In 1909, only one
year after affiliation with the department, the Carpenters refused to
recognize its decision awarding to the Sheet 'Metal Workers the juris-
diction to erect metal trim. The department suspended them and asked
the Federation to do likewise. This was the occasion for the usual
speeches about the value of cooperation. The Federation refused and
suggested the inevitable conference. The Carpenters then withdrew from
the department." In 1915 they induced the department to reverse its
decision and reaffiliated. 97 They then deigned to confer for some 13
90. California State Brewers Institute v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 19 F.
Supp. 824 (N. D. Cal. 1937).
91. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Int'l Union of Brewery Workers, 5 LAD. RM..
REp. 112 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) (note that this suit was brought by the Brewery Union
whereas the prior suit was brought by the operators).
92. PRoc. (1937) 125, 534-548.
93. N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1939, p. 10, col. 3.
94. Paoc (1937) 125, 542-3. N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1939, p. 11, col. 1, Oct. 11, 1939,
p. 21, col. 1.
95. PRoc. (1911) 24, 339.
96. PPoc. (1934) 360.
97. Paoc. (1934) 361.
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years with the Sheet Metal Workers; an agreement was reached in 1928.8
In 1918 the department set up a tribunal composed of representatives of
labor, entrepreneurs and the building professions. This tribunal gave an
award against the Carpenters and they promptly withdrew. In 1927 the
department abandoned the board and its decisions against the Carpenters,
who then graciously consented to reenter. In the meantime the Brick-
layers had withdrawn in 1927 because of an adverse decision, and in
1929 the Carpenters again gained their freedom, this time because of
a quarrel over dues. In 1931 they were joined by the Electricians who
were opposed to the participation of employer representatives in settling
jurisdictional disputes.9" These unions are the big three in the building
trades and their state of mind and consequent defection substantially
lessened the ability of the department to handle jurisdictional disputes.
The department nevertheless gave decisions in cases involving them; it
could breathe more easily when they were not inside the fold and whether
they were in or out seemed to make little difference in their disposition
to accept decisions. In 1933 the big three clamored for readmittance
because the department had been given a formal place in the Recovery
Administration's Building Code. The department winced at the prospect
of the return of these ruthless and prodigal sons and refused to readmit
them. They feared particularly a coalition between them and a dissat-
isfied group of unions within the department. The officers of the Federa-
tion ordered the department to take them back.' Upon refusal, the
officers called a purported convention of the department, superseded the
regular department convention, reinstated the unions and reorganized
the department. The reorganized department then brought a suit in
the District of Columbia for possession of the books and papers. This
suit was lost on the ground that, though the Federation had complete
authority over the department, the officers had exceeded their authority.
The clear implication was that the officers might secure ratification at
the next convention. The "regular" department unions must have seen
the futility of their position. In 1935 they agreed upon a form of reor-
ganization.' Under the present constitution of the department, a per-
manent referee is appointed to settle disputes. 10 2 It is too early to tell
whether his decisions will command any greater respect than those of
his predecessors.
The record of the Federation is not one of complete failure. Lorwin
states that out of 207 jurisdictional cases reported between 1917 and
98. PROC. (1916) 374-376; (1917) 127; (1918) 126, 277; (1919) 153; (1928) 69-70.
99. This story can be found in PROC. (1934) 152, 488 et seq.; LORWIN, THlE AmEIU-
CAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (1933) 378-383; HABER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TIII
BUILDING TRADES (1932) 180-90.
100. PRoc. (1934) 152, 488 et seq., 541.
101. PROC. (1935) 107-127, 327-342, 435-437.
102. PROC. (1936) 600-602.
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1931, the number dealt with decreased from 91 between 1917 and 1920
to 64 between 1921 and 1925, and 52 between 1926 and 1931.1"3 From
1917 to 1931, 80 new disputes arose but only 16 of these originated after
1925.104 Obviously, then, in this period some disputes were settled, and
fewer new ones arose. This, however, was a period of increasing em-
ployment, a fact of particular advantage to skilled and organized labor.
In the early part of the century, Gompers again and again lamented that
the unions were unwilling ever to relinquish jurisdiction, so that the
Federation's efforts were largely futile. In the twenties the reports of
the Executive Council glow with recitals of a reckless cooperation which
is shortly to make labor one happy family. 3 In 1927 the Council reports
five voluntary agreements.' But, alas, in 1932 we find that the nine
disputes before the Convention have gone into the endless treadmill of
"conference,"'' 0 7 and in the following year the confession is made that
due to "unprecedented industrial depression and the terrible state of
unemployment there was little that could be done" to settle jurisdictional
disputes. 8 It would be a rash or opinionated man who would or could
draw any one conclusion from this history. The Federation's practice
has in it much that is sound and representative of general political tra-
dition. It emphasizes conciliation, discussion, compromise, consent -and
infinite patience. It is often able to secure a solution truly voluntary.
On a number of occasions, a weak union has been coerced to consent to
an admittedly unjust decision by threats of revocation or hostile action.
This is distressing to the lover of fair play, but it may be looked upon
as the risk taken by the sheep when it enters the wolf's fold. It is futile
to complain that the jurisdiction which on the whole is the best equipped
to settle the question has decided it wrong, particularly when the parties
have joined the association and submitted themselves to it. But there
is legitimate cause to complain when it has failed over a considerable
period of time to settle the question (a situation which we find to be
not at all uncommon) and the disputants obstruct the efforts of the
workers to determine a collective bargaining unit and of the employer
to order his relations with his employees.
II. THE COURTS
In such cases as we have been describing, there is a quite legitimate
demand for an authoritative forum which will delimit the area in which
the jurisdictional dispute operates, by protecting third-party interests and
103. LoRwIm, op. cit. supra note 99, at 342, n. 5.
104. Lorwin notes also a great falling off after 1925 of building trade disputes and a
revival again in 1929. Id. at 381.
105. PRoc. (1927) 258; (1929) 75.
106. Paoc. (1927) 44, 46-51, 399.
107. PROC. (1932) 79-82, 302-3, 409-22.
108. PROC. (1933) 290.
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allowing normal and effective labor relations despite the existence of
the dispute. This does not mean that we should seek another forum to
settle the question of jurisdiction itself. Recently, indeed, the Brewery
Union, whose story has been told in some detail above, has invoked
judicial review of the decision of the Federation rendered against it in
1933. In the case of Obergfell v. Green,'0 9 an injunction was granted
against the officers of the Federation and against the unions benefit-
ing from that award. The Brewers claimed that the decision of the
Federation was an unlawful interference with the contract rights repre-
sented by their charter jurisdiction. In this way they sought to avoid
the force of rules which limit judicial interference with the activities
of voluntary associations. The court upheld the Brewers' position. On a
motion to dismiss the complaint, it ruled that the action of 1933 took
from the brewery drivers "property rights of a substantial kind, probably
the most important property right which unionized employees have . . .
the action . . . transferring the brewery drivers . . was entirely
beyond the powers of the AFL, in that it violated the constitution of
the AFL and the contract of the AFL" with the Brewery Union. 110 In
granting the injunction, the court said that if it withheld relief, it would
amount to a "judicial recognition of authority acquired by usurpation." 
1
On the other hand, two district courts in California have held (in
this same controversy) that they are without jurisdiction to review the
award of the Federation." In one of them, California State Brewers
Institute v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al., the court
refused to advise the Brewery Operators as to the union to deal with.
Treating the question as identical with the problem of charter jurisdiction
(an inexact position, as I believe), it said:
"Decisions reached by labor unions according to their own con-
stitution and by-laws of procedure are not to be invalidated by a
court of law, provided that all parties have had an opportunity to
be heard, that the decision has not been arbitrary, and that the
fundamental law of the association has not been violated. A court
of law will, therefore, not interfere with the decision of the American
Federation of Labor, with its internal organization, or with the
method of its making or enforcing its awards. The court recognizes
the right of the American Federation of Labor to adjust jurisdic-
tional disputes. The settlement of such controversies and the en-
109. 29 F. Supp. 589 (D. D. C. 1939).
110. Obergfell v. Green, 27 F. Supp. 934 (D. D. C. 1939).
111. Obergfell v. Green, 29 F. Supp. 589, 592 (D. D. C. 1939).
112. California State Brewers' Inst. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 19 F. Supp.
824 (N. D. Cal. 1937) and International Union of United Brewery Workers v. Call-
fornia State Brewers' Institute, 25 F. Supp. 870 (S. D. Cal. 1938). Note, however, that
in the later case, the court enjoined all boycott action pending a settlement of the dis-
pute. This decision has now been reversed. 106 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
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forcement of such decisions is clearly the function of the Federation.
That higher body to which these two labor organizations belong,
and of which they are members, must determine this matter and
render and enforce a binding decision between them, and agreements
reached recognizing the American Federation of Labor decisions
would be valid and binding on the parties should such agreements
be reached."'
113
Let us give brief consideration to the "property" concept invoked by
the District of Columbia court as it bears on judicial control of the
affairs of voluntary associations." 4 Individual members of trade unions,
who have been expelled, have on occasion secured reinstatement by
mandamus or injunction. The court may treat membership as a "con-
tract" or "property" right arising out of the articles of association. In
the usual case this will mean no more than that the member can demand
that he be given a fair hearing prior to expulsion.'", As Professor Chafee
has shown, this protection cannot be adequately explained on a theory
of contract, particularly when procedural safeguards are implied by the
court." 6 There are cases where the substantial justice of the expulsion
has been considered and where it has been set aside as contrary to "natural
justice", "unauthorized" or "malicious." The by-laws of a trade union
provided that any member using his influence against the legislative
representative of the union should be expelled. A member petitioned the
legislature for reconsideration of a law supported by the representative.
His expulsion was held to violate his constitutional rights."7 A recent
case protected a member against a change in seniority rules considered
unjust. - 8 Cases of sheer malice, i.e., of expulsion for a reason not legiti-
mately related to the purpose of the association, are extremely rare. In
a recent Pennsylvania case, expulsion was achieved by dissolving the
union, and organizing a new one which refused to admit the plaintiffs.
The reasons for this action were obscure, the court found the "expulsion"
to be malicious, ordered reinstatement and damages for loss of wages. 10
Many courts, however, refuse to consider the merits if the trial has been
113. California State Brewers Inst. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 19 F. Supp.
824, 824-5 (N. D. Cal. 1937).
114. Professor Chafee has given an admirable discussion of the attitude and conduct
of the courts towards voluntary associations in his article, The Intcrnal Affairs of Asso-
ciations Not for Profit (1930) 43 ILMv. L. REv. 993.
115. Metropolitan Baseball Club v. Simons, 17 NV. N. C. 153 (Pa. 1835), (1922) 7
CoRN. L. Q. 262; Harman v. Raub, 25 Pa. C. C. Rep. 97 (1901); Taboada v. Sociedad
Espanola de Beneficiencia Mutua, 191 Cal. 187, 215 Pac. 673 (1923); International Union
of Steam and Operating Engineers v. Owens, 119 Ohio St. 94, 162 N. . 386 (1923).
116. See Chafee, supra note 114, at 1006.
117. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 At. 70 (1921).
118. Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 124 N. J. Eq. 269, 1 At. (2d)
386 (1938).
119. Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Sup. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939).
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fair. Voluntary associations, they hold, are the arbiters of their own
policies, their predilections and their antipathies.120  The "contract" or
"property" concept is an artificial device to protect the helpless individual
member in preserving an association without which he may not be able
to secure work in his trade. It is a recognition of this need, rather than
any necessary legal consequence arising from the form of the transac-
tion, which justifies the courts which do grant relief to trade union
members.
The type of case involving the power of a national union over its
chartered locals is more germane. Most of these cases involve the funds
of dissolved or suspended locals. There is a strong disposition to regard
the members of the local as having an interest in the funds independent
of national affiliation. In the absence of a specific charter provision, it
may be held that a majority of the local members do not lose control
of the funds despite charter revocation or a decision of the superior
body in favor of a minority.1 2 ' But most courts will recognize the claim
by the superior body if based on specific contract. 22 Even so, the charter
must provide a fair method of hearing 22 and the procedure must be
followed.' 2 4 An occasional court may add that the revocation must be
120. State v. New Orleans Funeral Directors Ass'n, 161 La. 81, 108 So. 132 (1926);
Long v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 155 Md. 265, 141 Atl. 504 (1928) ; International Union
of Steam & Operating Engineers v. Owens, 119 Ohio St. 94, 162 N. E. 386 (1928).
121. Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N. Y. 232, 29 N. E. 139 (1891).
122. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, 120 N. J. Eq. 346, 184 Atl.
832 (1936). Contra: State Council v. Enterprise Council, 75 N. J. Eq. 245, 72 At. 19
(1909). Cf. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v. Int. Woodworkers of America, 197
Wash. 491, 85 P. (2d) 1099 (1938); Local v. Cairns, 197 Wash. 476, 85 P. (2d) 1109
(1938); Local v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P. (2d) 1116 (1938); Harris v. Backman,
86 P. (2d) 456 (Ore. 1939). All these involved the quarrel between the CIO and the
AFL (Carpenters Union) concerning the affiliation of sawmill workers. In all cases, the
overwhelming majority of members of the AFL locals voted to go over to the CIO. The
local charters provided that as long as ten members remained, the locals should con-
tinue to exist. All decisions held that AFL locals were entitled to the funds. In the
Washington cases, three judges dissented. (See cases infra note 165 relating to the inter-
vention of the NLRB and the courts in other phases of this controversy). Accord: Low
v. Harris, 90 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937). In these decisions the courts refused to
hold that funds raised in addition to those required by the national body were to be dis-
tinguished and treated as "belonging" to the "local association" and so controllable by
the majority. Some courts, however, have adopted this theory for local benefit funds,
at least in the absence of a very explicit charter statement to the contrary. Scott v.
Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269 Pac. 455 (1928), following State Council v. Emery, 219
Pa. 461, 68 At. 1023 (1908) (emphasizing the idea that trust funds must be devoted to
the intended purposes).
123. Neal v. Hutcheson, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (suspension under a
by-law permitting the national president to act without hearing invalid).
124. Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 50 (1932) (district council cannot
take over funds of local without following prescribed procedure). Schweitzer v. Schneid-
er, 87 N. J. Eq. 88, 97 Ati. 159, aff'd, 86 N. J. Eq. 256, 98 At. 1086 (1916) (national
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"for cause," but does not make it clear whether this implies more than
a requirement of fair hearing.Y5 However, in these cases the "property"
claim in the conventional sense is strong and real. In a rare case such
as Musical Mutual Protective Union z,. WVeber,2  there arises the ques-
tion of the right to the charter itself. Though the court said that the local
had a "perfect right to govern its own internal affairs," in matters con-
cerning affiliation it is subject to the discipline of its superior body. -7
The case, however, does not prove much, since the prescribed procedure
had been followed and the local had clearly violated a binding rule.
It is doubtful that there is any such justification, as there is in the
member cases or in the local cases involving funds, for judicial control
of the decisions of the Federation on charter jurisdiction. Two previous
appeals to the courts to review the AFL award in the Brewers' case
have met with refusal."" These seem to be the only cases directly in
point. A rather frivolous analogy concerned the revocation of the charter
of a local chapter of a college sorority. The girls, it seems, were not
the right sort for their more exalted sisters on other campuses. This
grave issue raised in two companion cases divided the courts of New
York'29 and Massachusetts,' 30 which found, respectively, that "contract"
rights were and were not invoked, the New York court going on to find
the expulsion unauthorized by the rules. But the claim that charter
jurisdiction is a "property" or "contract" right, even if verbally plausible,
is too unreal a consideration to determine whether the courts are an
appropriate forum to review Federation decisions. It has been previously
pointed out that one of the difficulties of deciding these disputes has been
the impossibility of formulating controlling rules of judgment. The
process is one of compromising irreconcilable claims, of creating a solu-
tion out of a complex of faulty definitions, disputed priorities and in-
eluctable shifts in industrial process and history.
In Watson v. Jones one faction of the local congregation of the Presby-
terian church was suing for church property.13' The general assembly
of the church had decided in favor of this faction. The losing faction
claimed that in matters involving property the courts were the final judges
union split into two factions, great majority of local support one faction; hold entitled
to funds).
125. Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 127, 269 Pac. 455, 457.
126. 123 Misc. 182, 205 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1924). Cf. Taussig %,. Weber, 123
Misc. 180, 205 N. Y. Supp. 605 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
127. 123 Misc. 182, 188, 205 N. Y. Supp. 599, 604.
128. California State Brewers Inst. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 19 F. Supp.
824 (N. D. Cal. 1937), PRoc. (1937) 534-548.
129. Heaton v. Hull, 28 Misc. 97, 59 N. Y. Supp. 281 (Sup. Ct. 1899), aff'd, 51 App.
Div. 126, 64 N. Y. Supp. 279 (3d Dep't 1900).
130. Heaton v. Richmond, 42 Amd. L. Rzv. 178 (Mass. 1900).
131. 13 Wall. 679 (U. S. 1871).
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of the meaning of the church's constitution. The issue, they argued, was
"whether the church in relation to its civil interests is organized under
the authority of law or above it."' 2 The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Miller speaking, refused to review the determination of the assembly.
He admitted that the English courts, following Lord Eldon, had set
themselves up as arbiters of church law. We can understand, said lie,
that the Lord Chancellor of England who is the head and representative
of the established church and who controls very largely the church
patronage "should feel, even in dealing with a dissenting church, but
little delicacy in grappling with the most abstruse problems of theological
controversy or in construing the instruments which those churches have
adopted as their rules of government or inquiring into their customs and
usages. The dissenting church in England is not a free church in the
sense in which we apply the term in this country . . ."183 But such,
he said, should not be the rule in this country. ". . . It is easy to see
that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole
subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written
laws, and fundamental organization of every religious denomination may,
and must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they would
become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the
ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This principle
would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church
laws, would open the way to all the evils which we have depicted as
attendant upon the doctrine of Lord Eldon, and would, in effect, transfer
to the civil courts where property rights were concerned the decision of
all ecclesiastical questions."'
134
It is doubtful that the criteria for judging disputes within unions
should be or could be reduced to standards manageable in a court of law.
Reference to the Brewers' case, though it may convince one of the likeli-
hood that injustice will be done by the Federation, will equally convince
that it is hopeless to appeal to the law of property or contract to find
a solution unless, indeed, one is prepared to say that the words of the
charter are the sole relevant determinative of decision. If that is the
contention of the Brewers, then it implies, as was stated by the Council,
that the Federation is without power or authority to deal "with ever
changing scenes and quite regardless of conflicts between affiliated unions
and disastrous consequences affecting the labor movement as a whole." 1 5
Professor Chafee has put the matter excellently: "Legal supervision must
132. Id. at 703. Cf. the language of Goldsborough, J., in Obergfell v. Green, 29 F.
Supp. 589, 592 (D. D. C. 1939) : ". . . whenever usurped authority comes in contact with
the jurisprudence of a democracy it then and there, instantly, ceases to exist."
133. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728 (U. S. 1871).
134. Id. at 733.
135. PROC. (1937) 125.
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often be withheld for fear that it may do more harm than good. The
principle of freedom and growth is easily overlooked by judges. They
are apt to regard the documents with which the association starts its
existence with the same strictness as if they were private contracts or
trusts . . .The consequence of this judicial interference is, that if these
original documents lack workable provisions for their own alteration,
then the association is denied the power to adapt itself to inevitable
changes in its environment."' 30
The whole practice and history of the Federation demonstrates that
paper claims to jurisdiction are recognized as only a starting point or
prinia facie case. The charters of the associated unions appear to represent
a modus vivendi, a voluntary arrangement whereby they can live and
work together. In Cherokee Indians v. Georgia,37 the Supreme Court
was asked by the Cherokee Indians to declare as against the State of
Georgia their sole jurisdiction over their tribal lands. This claim they
based on a treaty with the United States. Mr. justice Johnson, denying
in his usual forceful and emphatic manner the existence of a justiciable
issue, said, "The contest is distinctly a contest for empire. It is not
a case of meum et tuum in the judicial but in the political sense.
Not an appeal to laws but to force. There is then a great deal of good
sense in the rule laid down in the Nabob of Ascot's case, to-wvit, that as
between sovereigns, breaches of treaty were not cognizable in a Court
of Justice."' s
Unless mistaken in my understanding of the nature of the issues
involved and of the method in which they are settled, it follows that such
decisions are not the subject of legal judgment. The members of the
Federation have surely been aware of this. They have witnessed decisions
flagrantly unjust. They have known that in a body political in nature
decisions may often be political. They have understood that if they did
not like a decision, they might leave."" The recent action of the District
Court of the District of Columbia in granting the Brewers an injunction
against the execution of the 1933 award ° is apparently the first such
action in our courts.'
136. Chafee, supra note 114, at 1027-1028.
137. 5 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1831).
138. Id. at 28, 29.
139. Compare the following remarks in course of the 1937 debate: "If the claim be
sound that affiliation to the American Federation of Labor involves a property right sub-
ject to review, regulation and control by our equity courts then indeed will the v:hole
structure of American allied or federated trade unionism and of voluntary relation-hip
be placed in jeopardy." PRoc. (1937) 125.
140. Obergfell -. Green, 29 F. Supp. 5S9 (D. D. C. 1939).
141. A very interesting example, showing how ancient is the problem, of judicial deter-
mnation of craft-jurisdiction comes from the pre-Revolutionary Mayor's Court of New
York. The court, in 1674, ordered the brewers and bakers to allow the corn and wine
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Our courts have not, however, been at all shy in enjoining picketing
or boycott of an employer who has contracted with or employs members
of a rival union. For some of them, at least, it is enough that the
objective is a closed shop ;142 for others, that it seeks to induce a breach
of contract ;141 for others, that the pickets are not employees 141 - all three
concurring provide a feast of reasons. In contrast is the courageous
decision in the famous case of Stillwell z. Kaplan.14r An employer, having
a closed shop agreement with a union, was picketed by a rival. Said
Chief Judge Pound:
"We would be departing from established precedents if we upheld
this injunction. We would thereby give to one labor union an advan-
tage over another by prohibiting the use of peaceful and honest
persuasion in matters of social rivalry. This might strike a death
blow to legitimate labor activities. It is not within the province of
the courts to restrain conduct which is within the allowable area of
economic conflict."
' 146
Successfully to fulfill its purpose, labor needs vigorous, honest, repre-
sentative unions. The existence of a contract with a union is no assur-
ance that these objectives have been fulfilled. An employer may find it
to his advantage to protect himself from effective union activity by an
unholy alliance with a corrupt or dominated union. The court has no
mechanism for distinguishing between unions. Consequently, it must
suffer the process of selection to proceed by picket which may be the
only available instrument. If a bad union wins or an employer is injured
in the process, this is no more than may happen in any field in which
democracy and laissez-faire are accepted. This is the philosophy of Still-
well v. Kaplan, and since the advent of the anti-injunction acts which
porters, rather than the day laborers, to carry their goods. This probably did not involve
review of a prior decision of any adjudicative body. GRIFFITH, HisToRY orF AmERICAN
Cirr GOVERNMENT (1938) 138. The author is indebted to his colleague, Dean Mark
DeWolfe Howe, for this reference.
142. Keith Theatre v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692 (1936) ; Yankee Network
v. Gibbs, 3 N. E. (2d) 228 (Mass. 1936); Carter Sample Furniture House v. Retail
Furniture Employees Local, 122 N. J. Eq. 575, 196 Atl. 210 (1937); Stalban v. Fried-
man, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 343 (Sup. Ct. 1939); McKay v. Retail Auto-
mobile Salesmen's Union, 4 LAB. REL. RrP. 356 (Cal. 1939).
143. Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917); International Organiza-
tion, United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co.,
18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 536 (1927); Goyette v.
Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923) ; Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American
Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers, 305 Pa. 206, 157 At. 588 (1931).
144. Armstrong Cork & Insulation Co. v. Walsh, 276 Mass. 263, 177 N. E. 2 (1931);
United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cerl. dcnicd, 297
U. S. 714 (1936) ; Newton v. Laclede Steel Co., 80 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935);
Scavenger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
145. 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
146. Stillwell v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 412, 182 N. E. 63, 66 (1932).
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forbid courts to enjoin picketing where there is a "labor dispute," courts
which would formerly have granted an injunction have had to follow
Stillwell v. Kaplan,47 unless they are prepared to hold that a jurisdic-
tional dispute is not a "labor dispute."14
The result of Stillwell v. Kaplan may, however, be harsh, ex'pensive
and wasteful in particular cases. An electoral campaign which did not
cease after there had been an adequate time to test issues, a civil war
which did not contain within itself the germs of resolution, would be
futile and exasperating. The economic conflict which the case tolerates
may carry the parties to exhaustion rather than to a decent or even to
any solution at all. This we have seen can be true even if both of the
unions are members of the Federation, and it may be even more true
where they are not.
III. THE LABOR BOARDS
The procedure of the labor boards suggests the possibilities of a posi-
tive solution.'49 The National Labor Relations Board is authorized to
determine a collective bargaining representative by ascertaining the will
of a majority of the workers in an appropriate bargaining unit. We have
seen, however, that the Board so far has refused to take jurisdiction
where the question of representation arose out of a dispute between
unions subject to the authority of a common federation. I repeat that
the determination of a representative does not by its terms settle a juris-
dictional dispute. As a result of elections in plant A, a driver may find
that he is represented by the Brewers Union, and in plant B by the Team-
147. Fur Workers Union v. Fur Workers Union (1939) 7 U. S. L ANTEM 693, aff'g,
105 F. (2d) 1 (App. D. C. 1939) ; J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N.E. 569
(1932) ; Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers' Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich.
1934) ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934) ; Edjomac Amusement Corp. v. Empire State Motion Picture
Operators' Union, 273 N. Y. 647, 8 N. E. (2d) 329 (1937).
148. United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) I (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert. de-
nied, 297 U. S. 714 (1936) ; Newton v. Lalede Steel Co., 80 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935). Cf. Stalban v. Friedman, 171 'Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
Cotillo, J., holding that Stillwell v. Kaplan should no longer be applied, despite passage
of State anti-injunction act (N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 876-a) because of protection now
afforded to labor by the State Labor Act.
Mayor LaGuardia has announced that he would not tolerate "indiscriminate" picketing
in jurisdictional disputes. The situation involves "cross-picketing" i.e., for each AFL
shop picketed by a CIO union, the AFL pickets a CIO shop. It is not clear whether the
Mayor's refusal to "tolerate' means that he will have pickets dispersed or arrested. The
'Mayor feels his position is not inconsistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. N. Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1939, p. 1, col 3. His announcement was attacked as a "usurpation of power!'
N. Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1939, p. 1, col. 2, p. 11, col. 3.
149. See Comment (1938) The Influence of the National Labor Relations Board itpon
Inter-Union Conflicts, 38 CoL L. REv. 1243, for an able and comprehensive survey of the
materials on this subject.
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sters Union. This may be true because in plant A there has been no prior
history of craft organization and the Board decided that the employees
constitute a single unit for collective bargaining, or it may be the drivers
themselves may wish to have a representative common to the whole
plant. Now, to be sure, decisions of this sort, which give rise to the
possibility that the structure of collective bargaining in particular plants
will cut across national charter jurisdictional lines, which in other words
allow drivers in one plant to be represented by the Teamsters Union and
in another by the Brewers Union may indirectly break down the strength
of a national union, may bring pressure on the Federation to bring out
some solution. In so far, too, as national solidarity among similar workers
is valuable to the worker, the result of this atomization may be harmful.
This is a sufficient reason why the Board should be cautious in entering
such disputes. But where the Federation has been unable within a decent
interval - let us say two years - to bring the parties together, and where
the parties interfere with any attempt by employers and employees to
find pro tern a basis of operation, the balance, I believe, is decidedly in
favor of Board intervention. Such action seems superior to resort to
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act or repressive anti-picketing statutes.
We have already referred to the attempt of the Brewery Institute to
secure a declaration from the federal court in California as to which
of the rival unions was the proper representative for collective bargaining.
The Brewers based their appeal principally on the fact that the Board
refused in such cases to take jurisdiction. As we have seen, the court
declined jurisdiction on the ground that it would not review action of
the Federation.' 50 It maintained, furthermore, that the Board was right
in taking the same position. But in a more recent phase of the contro-
versy, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declared
emphatically that the Board does have and must exercise jurisdiction to
determine a collective bargaining agency regardless of the fact that the
occasion for the determination is an intra-Federation dispute." 1 The
district court, at the suit of the brewery workers, had declared that the
Brewery Union was the bargaining agent for the brewery deliverymen
in California, Oregon and Washington. The circuit court of appeals
reversed the decision and ordered the action to be dismissed. The Board,
150. California State Brewers Institute v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
19 F. Supp. 824 (N. D. Cal. 1937).
151. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. International Union of Brewery Work-
ers, 106 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). The court argues that the Board has not
been relieved by Congress because the unions by their private arrangement with the
Federation are subject to its jurisdiction. Here is a case of violent and widespread con-
troversy. Both the men and the employer are entitled to relief. Though the Board has
discretion as to whether it will entertain a representation proceeding, it is a "legal"
discretion.
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it held, had jurisdiction which, under the familiar rule, must be exhausted
before a court could intervene.5 2
I can well understand that the Board hesitates to enter these cases,
though it probably "has jurisdiction." ' 3 There is nothing in the debate
or the committee reports on the Act bearing directly on the issue, but
the power to determine units and to hold elections is stated to be similar
to that of the Railway Mediation Board.' This Board has, reluctantly,
held elections in cases precipitated by jurisdictional disputes.'5 The power
probably exists, but its exercise is politically dangerous. The Federation
has indicated its opposition to Board jurisdiction and seeks to amend the
Act specifically to exclude jurisdiction in such cases.'*" The Federation
members would much rather fight among themselves than see the con-
trol of these issues, no matter on what level, go to an outside authority,
particularly a government organ. Furthermore the elective process which
the Board must use puts the question to the rank and file. We have
seen that when the brewery workers decided by'a nearly unanimous
vote to remain or go into the Brewery Union, President Green said
that the wishes of the workers were immaterial. The New York Labor
Relations Act specifically forbids the state board from intervening in
such a matter.157 The NLRB is fighting now on many fronts. It has
earned particularly the enmity of the AFL and recently of the CIO,
and might find its position more intolerable still, were it to change an
established rule in the face of that hostility. It is, perhaps, then a case
where Congressional action is necessary. The Federation seems deter-
mined to oppose a specific grant of power over these disputes though
it should realize that the result of opposing a deliberate solution is to
provoke the application of very bad solutions.
It may be, of course, that neither union is willing to risk a show of
strength in which case the employer is (where Stillwdil ,. Kaplin is
law) without remedy, unless he may set in motion the machinery of
152. Id. at 876.
153. Comment (1938) 38 COL L. Rrv. 1243, 1245, states that the NLRB "clearly has
the power to intervene in disputes over representation of workers betv. een unions affiliated
with a common body."
154. SEn-. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 14; H. . RE'. No. 972, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 20.
155. The authorities for this are collected in Comment (1933) 33 CoL. L. R=. 1243, n.
5, 1245, n. 16. S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) to amend the Railvay Labor Act pro-
vided for "neutral" boards to determine who should vote in order that antipathy created
by the determination not be directed against the Board itself. Sm. REP. No. 1065, 73d
Cong., 2d. Sess. (1934). This bill was not the basis of the Act finally passed.
156. Proposed amendment to § 9 (c) of the Act included a provision that the Board
shall not have jurisdiction to investigate any question or controversy behteen individuals
or groups within the same labor organization or affiliated with the same parent organiza-
tion. (1939) 3 LAB. REL. REP. 674.
157. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 705 (3).
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the Board. In a capitalist society where nothing runs unless the entre-
preneur runs it or is permitted to run it, the employer represents in
cases of this sort a legitimate social interest. Until recently the National
Labor Relations Board has not permitted employer petitions seeking a
determination of a representation dispute. The danger of such petitions
are, indeed, considerable and quite obvious. If the employer may petition
as a matter of right, he can do so at the first threat of unionization and
force his employees to elect against an outside union or for a company
union before they understand the issues or have been laid open to per-
suasion. The Board, however, has discretion in any case in entertaining
jurisdiction. It has recently capitulated to the terrific pressure of the
forces hostile to it and its rules now permit employer petition.'5 8 The
same is true by law in Minnesota,"" New York,'60 Pennsylvania,'01 and
Wisconsin. 2 In New York the Board may entertain such a petition, 10
but can only proceed to final action on it if at least one of the unions
consents.
6 4
One problem remains. In the famous fight between the Carpenters
Union (AFL) and the Woodworkers (CIO) in Oregon, the Board held
an election which the CIO won.' The Carpenters treated the results
of the election as irrelevant.' They and their associate unions, by picket
and boycott, held up a good part of the lumber business for some period
of time. The public was angry and frantic, and the experience provided
a plausible occasion for enacting one of the most reactionary of existing
anti-picketing laws.
In the Star Publishing Company case, a newspaper was threatened by
the Teamsters Union with a, boycott if certain of its employees did not
become members.' 7 The employees were loyal to the Newspaper Guild.
158. N.L.R.B. Rules and Regulations, Art. III, § 1.
159. MINN. LABOR RELATIoNs Acr, § 16(b).
160. N. Y. LABOR LAW, §705(3), (4).
161. PA. LABOR RELATION S Acr, § 7(c) allows a petition by an employer "who has not
committed an unfair labor practice."
162. WIs. EMPLOYMENT PEAcE Ac, § 111.05(4).
163. N. Y. LABOR LAW, § 705(4).
164. In the first two months after the NLRB amended its rules to allow employer
petitions, 16 employers appealed for elections, representing 4 percent .of the total of 400
petitions presented to the Board during that period. The New York Board has reported
85 employer petitions out of a total of 2581 petitions received over a period of 2 years,
and 52 of these were occasioned by disputes where two or more unions were involved.
(1939) 5 LAE. REL RaP. 41.
165. Jones Lumber Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 855 (1937), (1937) 1 LAi. REL. REP. 220.
166. (1937) 1 LAB. REL. REP. 331.
167. 4 N.L.R.B. 498 (1937). Other cases where the Board ordered the employes to
recognize one union in the face of threats of picketing and boycott by a rival union are
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 193 (1937) ; Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co.,
5 N.L.R.B. 959 (1938); Simmons Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 208 (1938).
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They refused to join the Teamsters Union and were discharged. The
NLRB admitted that the position of the employer was "unenviable" and
that if it were forced to reinstate these employees it might be unable to
operate its newspaper. But it held (quite properly) that the discharge
interfered with the statutory right freely to choose representatives for
collective bargaining. 6 Under the competitive regime represented by
Stillwell v. Kaplan, the employer was as free as was his employees to
choose the stronger union. The National Labor Relations Act takes
from him this choice. It puts the processes of law in the place of a
balder economic conflict. But if it compels the employer to recognize
a union too weak to protect him from a rival's deadly boycott and yet
gives him no legal substitute for his freedom, it may provoke legitimate
resentment. The boycott makes a mock both of the employer who is told
that his employees' choice is none of his business and of the employees
whose choice becomes the occasion for a stoppage of work.
At least one court has enjoined" 9 activity by a union defeated in a
Board representation proceeding; and recently some, at least, of the
Supreme Court judges have in the course of argument indicated that
they would do that. The Norris-LaGuardia Act forbids injunction
in labor disputes. If it is granted that a jurisdictional fight is a labor
dispute, does it cease to be one because the Board has certified a repre-
sentative in a particular unit? It has been argued above that the Board's
decision does not settle the jurisdictional dispute as such. It is said,
however, that picket and boycott after certification interfere with the
right of the majority to choose a representative which under the Act
becomes the exclusive representative, and that there is an implied repeal
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is said, furthermore, that the minority
is asking the employer to violate his statutory duty to bargain solely with
the majority. It should not be overlooked, however, that the Act pre-
serves the right to strike.170 From this it may be argued that the Act
does not outlaw the economic weapons of labor, and if we accept Stillwdl
v. Kaplan, we recognize that strikes and picketing are legitimate instru-
ments whereby a minority or even outsiders may seek to win over the
workers to their union, so that the minority will become the majority.
It is true that the need for these weapons is no longer so urgent. The
168. N.L.R.B. v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
169. Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (XV. D. Ito. 1937).
Cf. Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 243 (1939), where N. Y. State
Labor Board said there wmas no question that the contracting union represented employees
and so refused to certify; an injunction against the outside union was granted.
170. Professor (judge) Magruder suggests that as the statute imposes upon the em-
ployer the duty to bargain with the unit designated by the Board, a strike to compel him
to violate this duty may be held illegal as a matter of common law. Magruder, A Half
Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective Bargaining (1937) 50
H.v. L. Rnv. 1071, 1107.
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machinery of the Board provides a formal process through which rival
claims may make their appeal. That, of course, would not be so if the
Board accepted jurisdiction prematurely; but to date at least the Board
has, been well aware of this danger. Furthermore the certification does
not preclude a new election after the lapse of a reasonable time, possibly
a year, even though the successful union negotiates a contract for a
longer period.
1 7 1
But on the whole, it is at least doubtful whether the Wagner Act
works a repeal pro tanto of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."' In the course
of the Congressional debates on the Act, Senator Walsh, in reply to an
objection that the majority rule might be unfair to minorities, said:
"'any agreement arrived at with the majority representatives is applicable
to all the workers in the unit. If a dissenting minority do not like the
terms of the agreement, there is nothing in the bill which prevents the
minority from quitting or striking."' 73 Moreover, an amendment was
offered in the House to the effect that, though nothing in the Act should
impair the right to strike, a strike after an agreement made between
an authorized majority and its employer should be considered "as a
violation of the spirit of this act."' 74 Mr. Connery, the sponsor of the
bill in the House, said that this amendment would take "the heart right
out of the bill."' 75 The amendment was lost.
7 6
Professor Robert R. R. Brooks in his recent and excellent book, Unions
of Their Own Choosing, opposes any amendment of the law permitting
the use of the injunction against the activities of defeated minorities:
"Injunction law has not succeeded in the past in inducing indus-
trial peace. The Norris-LaGuardia Act marked a recognition of
this fact. The NLRA (sic) went further by substituting adminis-
trative handling of human relations in industry for judicial repres-
171. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. 662 (1938); Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 8 N.L.R.B. 508 (1938). The New York Board has adopted a rule that its
certification will be conclusive for one year: N.Y.L.R.B., Preliminary Rules and Regu-
lations, Art. III, § 11.
172. In Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607, 610 (D. Minn. 1937),
the court states: "That Congress did not intend to limit in any way the actions of the
minority in protesting against the agreements of the majority and generally in taking
legal measures by strike to achieve redress of alleged grievances, is sustained by the pro-
vision of § 163, 29 U.S.C.A., which reads: 'Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.' The court
leaves open the question of whether it has jurisdiction to enjoin interference with an
agreement between an employer and a representative certified by the Board."
And see the discussions in Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263, 267 (W. D. Mo.
1937), aff'd, 96 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ; and in Cupples Co. v. American Fed-
eration of Labor, 20 F. Supp. 894, 897-900 (E. D. Mo. 1937).
173. 79 CoNG. REc. 7672 (1935).





sion. The advantages of the administrative process lies in its flexi-
bility, in the expertness of administrators in their specialized field,
and in the general concept of removing the cause of trouble rather
than suppressing the result. The leaders of organized labor will be
short sighted indeed if, by refusal to accept the board's decision in
inter-union conflicts, they provoke legislative reaction."' 177
This uneasy argument contains, I believe, the germs of contradiction.
Mr. Brooks believes that the administrative procedure with its special-
ization and flexibility is the appropriate method of settling such disputes.
-Well, by hypothesis, the dispute has been settled by that method. The
question then is whether the Board's action shall be made operative in
the face of opposition. Mr. Brooks' argument seems further to imply
that an injunction would not in any case be effective because injunc-
tions have not in the past brought industrial peace. But as I have pointed
out, in the past labor was without the protection now afforded by the
labor acts. An injunction based on a determination of the Labor Board
is very different from an injunction which is part and parcel of a general
system of repression. Mr. Brooks concludes by abjuring labor leaders to
be reasonable lest they provoke reactionary measures. But history shows
that it is not unusual for rival labor leaders each to insist that the reason-
able thing is for his rival to capitulate. In such cases they cannot be led
to believe that they are responsible for any reaction which may occur.
We are faced then with a problem of whether it is worthwhile to solve
a situation which time has demonstrated cannot be settled by statesman-
like voluntarism, foresight and goodwill. Yet there is this to be said
for Mr. Brooks' position. First: In most cases the decision of the Board
is accepted. Second: jurisdictional and inter-union disputes are a rela-
tively minor cause of strikes rarely exceeding eight percent of the whole
number, and consisting on the average of only between five and six
percent' 78 The extent then, to which the productive forces of the country
are impeded by them has been exaggerated. These facts are particularly
relevant if an amendment permitting an injunction my be dangerous.
And I think it is not without risk. The danger would be primarily
symbolic. The amendment would propagate the fear and the hope that
177. BROOKS, UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHoosING (1939) 167.
178. The Bureau of Labor Statistics divides inter-union disputes into "jurisdictional"
(intra-Federation) and rival union (dual unions). For 1937 these two sources accounted
for 3.7 percent of the number of strikes, 4.5 percent of workers involved in strike, 2.4
percent of man-hours lost. For 1933 figures respectively were 5.4 percent, 5.1 percent,
9.5 percent. MoNTHLY LA. REv., May, 1938, p. 1200; May, 1939, p. 1125. The 1939 sta-
tistics show a slightly higher percentage. Number of strikes run January, 62 percent;
February, 6.9 percent; March, 6 percent; April, 7.8 percent; May, 4.8 percent; June,
6.7 percent. The number of workers involved as a rule follow the same course as number
of strikes. In February, 1939, however, one very large strike (Plymouth factory, De-
troit) brought the percentage of workers up to 19.3 percent. This is unusual.
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it was only the beginning of such amendments. Once admit that an
injunction may sometimes be warranted, and an opening for its return
is allowed in any other case in which a majority of the legislature- or
the impressionable courts- believe it warranted. But there are symbolic
arguments on the other side. A boycott in such cases does give rise to
a justified sense of grievance in those who feel that the Board certifi-
cation should end the controversy. This sense of grievance can easily
be exploited. Labor's opposition to injunction or to any authoritative
means of settlement lends plausibility to the argument that labor leader-
ship is indifferent to the injustice caused by jurisdictional disputes. So
the amendment, or some other action, comes anyway, but in forms more
drastic and objectionable.
Some courts have seized eagerly (without any prior administrative
determination) on the mere statutory declaration of the employees' right
to representatives of their choosing to give additional backing to pro-
hibition of strike activity in jurisdictional disputes.' Recently the
Supreme Court of Washington forbade the Teamsters to boycott a
brewery where the Brewers were in the majority, had a contract and
indeed owned stock in the company.18 The Oregon anti-picketing act
quite explicitly forbids picketing, boycott, etc., in jurisdictional disputes;
and laws in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin forbidding picketing, except
by a union representing a majority of employees, accomplish the same
result.' 8 ' These judicial decisions and statutory declarations take the
existence of a contract or majority membership in a union as establishing
a choice of representatives. Yet the contract or union membership may
be the result of employer coercion. A more recent pronouncement by
Thurman Arnold explaining the indictments of the Teamsters and the
Carpenters proceeds on a related line."" The Anti-Trust Act will be
used, he says, when the defendants seek "to destroy an established and
legitimate system of collective bargaining." What is the legal basis of
this "legitimacy?" It may, of course, have been established by the NLRB
(though not in these cases since they involved intra-Federation disputes) ,
it may have been established by an award of the AFL: the anti-trust
laws will serve as sanction for these awards; it may be predicated on
the existence of a contract or proof that the majority of employees favor
the recognized union.
The philosophy of the Stillwell case is as applicable as ever, in the
absence of an administrative determination. The argument may be made,
179. United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 5 LAB. REL. REP. 137 (Wash. 1939);
McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Union, 4 LAB. REL REP. 356 (Cal. 1939);
E. H. Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen's Union, 4 LAB. REL. REP. 356 (Cal. 1939); Smith
Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 4 LAB. REL. REP. 357 (Cal. 1939).
180. United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 5 LAB. REL. REP. 137 (Wash. 1939).
181. Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2; Pa. Laws 1939, Act 163; Wis. Laws 1939, c. 25.
182. N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1939, p. 1, col. 4 and p. 12, col. 1.
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of course, that the union should seek such a determination rather than
picket. But the time may not be ripe and if it is, then it is more to the
point that the employer, rather than resorting to the court, should seek
a remedy from the body whose special business it is to handle such
questions." 3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the
Fur W orkers Union case,184 recently affirmed by the Supreme Court,
has made clear, first, that the Board and not the court is the proper forum
for determining the collective bargaining agent; and second, that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act forbids an injunction in these cases. A matter
not within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board may
arise in a state having no local board. One court which refused to follow
the hands-off policy of Stillwell v. Kaplan itself held an election.s This
may be preferable to the pure assumption of those courts which accept
any union and any contract as the free choice of the employees. But its
use may offer a plausible objection to the establishment of an administra-
tive tribunal, capable of acting with that intelligence and sensitivity
developed by a constant application to one subject and possessing formal
procedures devised for the matter at hand.
EPILOGUE: PREDICAMENT OF THE AUTHOR
Department of Justice: You admit that the jurisdictional dispute when
accompanied by picket and boycott is wasteful and exasperating and
that whatever justifittion it may have is cancelled when the fight con-
tinues for year after year without settling the issues involved.
Author: I do.
D. of J.: You admit that the AFL may fail to bring the parties to
terms, that the NLRB is wary of entering the contest, and that the
courts are forbidden by the Norris-LaGuardia Acts to grant injunctions.
Yet you criticize us for using the anti-trust laws.
183. See discussion in Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607, 09-11
(D. Minn. 1937).
184. Fur Workers Union v. Fur Workers Union, 105 F. (2d) 1 (D. D. C. 1939), aff'd,
apparently by a per curiam decision of the Supreme Court, (1939) 7 L. REL. REP. 693.
Where the Board had taken jurisdiction but had not yet decided the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit forbade picketing. Union Premier Foad Stores v. Retail
Food Clerks and Managers Union, 98 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 193S), 101 F. (2d) 475
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939) cert. granted, 59 Sup. Ct. 1032 (U. S. 1939). On argument it was
indicated the case might be moot. N. Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1939, p. 31, col. 5. Mr. Justices
Hughes and Stone made remarks favorable to the position of the court below. If this
power is to be exercised, it should be done by the Board itself, which is in a better position
to evaluate the equities while the matter is pending.
185. Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food Clerks & Managers Union, 93 F. (2d)
821, 826 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
the order of the district court for an election on the ground that the Board alone had
jurisdiction to order an election.
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A.: Yes, I do. I am afraid that the action of the Department may
provide the courts with a moral justification for reasserting a jurisdic-
tion over labor activities of which we have fought so long and so bard
to deprive them. They, and not you, will distinguish between the legiti-
mate and the illegitimate.
D. of J.: Now you have proposed that the "evil" be cured by author-
izing the Labor Board to determine representatives for collective bar-
gaining despite the existence in the case of an intra-federation dispute?
Nevertheless you yourself admit that the AFL will probably never agree
to such legislation and that, consequently, the chances of Congressional
action are negligible.
A.: I am afraid that that is so, unless indeed your indictments con-
vince them of the necessity of finding a better solution. Indeed, I half
suspect that your move was tactical.
D. of J.: We will ignore your last remark and proceed. You say
further that the certifications of the Board should be enforced by in-
junction. Yet you admit that Labor may throw all its weight against
any change in the Norris-LaGuardia Act fearing lest it be an opening
wedge for further hostile action.
A.: I believe I did say something like that.
D. of J.: So you admit the evil, offer no practical way of dealing with
it, and yet criticize us for attempting a feasible solution.
A.: You may have me there. I might suggest, however, that there
are some evil things which we must bear, because the remedy may be
worse. We have suffered this condition for many years. Lapse of time
does not satisfy our longing for a decent solution; but it may demon-
strate that the condition is endurable. More than that it may show that
no one has a mandate to deal with it. The implication from long non-
user is reinforced by the Norris-LaGuardia Act which the federal equity
courts read as a Congressional expression of non-interference in juris-
dictional disputes. Though that law applies in terms only to injunctions,
its policy may have been directed to the anti-trust laws as well. Perhaps,
then, you should await a further revelation from the Vox Populi on the
Hill. In the meantime, as you have yourself told us, there is plenty of
work to be done in eliminating discrimination against modern building
methods and materials and allied abuses whether by Capital or Labor.
In such matters it will be unnecessary to teeter along the dizzy tightrope
of legitimacy, for the way is broad and clear.
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